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Discussant's Response to "AUDITOR'S 
ASSISTANT: A Knowledge Engineering Tool 
for Audit Decisions" 
John B. Sullivan 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
There is much about this article that I like. The focus of this article is on the 
development of an expert system designed to help the field auditor make more 
efficient decisions about the level of audit testing required. Both these topics 
are high on the list of priorities of all of the national accounting firms. A 
significant portion of the budgets of most major firms is being directed toward 
the development of personal computer-based expert systems to increase audit 
efficiency. 
The authors recognize the need for the active interaction of the field auditor 
in the use of an expert system. Too many articles fail to give proper credit to 
the level of knowledge which resides in the audit engagement team. Firms 
attempt to keep turnover at the partner, manager and senior levels to a 
minimum. As a result, audit engagements are frequently staffed by an 
engagement team with ten or eleven years of total client experience. I believe 
this paper attempts to give proper recognition to the benefits to be gained by 
tapping into that experience. The authors stress the importance of understand-
ing the client's business environment. In our firm's approach, we list 
"Understanding the Business" as the first step of the business review. 
Although this differs slightly from the authors' "understanding the client's 
business environment," I believe they both recognize this area as the first and 
most important step in an audit. 
The article is also one of the few which focus on the audit team and the 
decisions which must be made by that audit team. We need more articles on 
and research in this important area of audit practice. 
Unfortunately, I believe that my negative comments outweigh my positive 
comments. In summary, I do not believe that the authors are on the right track 
yet. My general impression of the knowledge engineering tool described in the 
paper is that it will not be widely endorsed in practice and it may be flawed in 
theory. 
In my view, some of the fatal theoretical flaws of the tool involve a failure to 
appreciate the complexity of the audit process. Individual pieces of audit 
evidence frequently impact more than one assertion, and indeed may impact 
other areas or the entire audit. For example, one piece of audit evidence which 
indicts the integrity of management may lead either to a qualification or a 
disclaimer of opinion. 
In addition, I do not believe that the authors' system, as described in this 
paper, gives enough weight to the importance and interaction of individual audit 
procedures. In Scenario One, the authors indicate revision of the nar from 0.83 
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to 0.92 based upon discussions with the credit manager on collectibility 
problems. As a result of this increase, an additional audit procedure which had 
been planned is not performed. This is even more distressing as the paper does 
not discuss whether or not any objective evidence other than discussions was 
used to put the team over the target level of 0.90. 
The additional audit procedure not performed is a review of ABC's credit 
policy. There have been so many instances of audit problems created by 
changes in a company's credit policy that not to perform such a basic procedure 
would lead me to question whether the engagement team had obtained an 
understanding of the business. 
From a practical point of view, this type of question would generally not 
represent any significant time savings. The engagement team did have access 
to the credit manager. How much longer would the conversation have lasted if 
the team had asked the credit manager if there were any changes in credit 
policy? The only way this could represent a significant time savings would be if 
there had been significant changes in policy. In that case, time savings should 
not be the driving force because a radical change in credit policy could mean a 
significant increase in potential uncollectible accounts. This could be true 
without regard to whether or not the accounts are over 120 days past due. 
Also in Scenario One, "the audit team finds the management and account-
ing personnel to be competent and trustworthy and decides that this evidence 
supports nar to degree 0.60." Where are the SAS 47 [AICPA, 1983] concepts 
of inherent and control risk in the authors' equation? I am sure we have all dealt 
with competent and trustworthy accounting personnel who, because of the 
existence of significant inherent risk, delivered to the auditors an accounts 
receivable section which contained a material error. This has frequently been 
the case where the industry has experienced rapid change such as the oil and 
gas industry or the savings and loan industry. By neglecting to assess the risk 
that the balance contains errors that could be material to the financial 
statements, the authors' belief functions could also be misstated. The article 
states "the audit team also knows that the maximum risk that nar is materially 
misstated is only 8%." This would appear to be a very bold statement, given 
the fact that the allowance for doubtful accounts has not been reviewed. 
However, even if this statement were true, SAS 39 [AICPA, 1981] would 
appear to set the limit of audit risk at about 0.05. 
The authors appear to either ignore, or fail to understand, the practical role 
of an audit program. One of the authors' statements is that "at any stage of the 
audit the auditor has to decide which procedures he or she is going to perform 
next." This question is generally answered, in practice, by the audit program. 
The authors' statement that the decision on what to do is taking place during 
the performance of the audit is simply not true for most audit engagements. 
AU Section 311.05 states that "the author should prepare a written audit 
program (or a set of written audit programs)." The audit programs are 
generally prepared during the planning stage of an engagement. The auditing 
literature also states that "as the examination progresses, changed conditions 
may make it necessary to modify the planned audit procedures." I assume that 
the elimination of planned audit procedures, as a result of changes in the actual 
versus planned strength of audit evidence represents the core of the authors' 
"engineering tool." 
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However, in an actual audit, I believe there would be significant practical 
problems with the system described by the authors. The system generally 
requires an assignment of degrees of support to each piece of audit evidence by 
the audit team. The audit team is described as comprising the audit senior, 
manager and partner. I know of no present audit engagements which require 
this much team decision making. On most medium-sized audit engagements, 
the audit team is not together on a daily basis, or even a weekly basis. Most 
decisions on the extent of audit procedures are made during the planning and 
review stages of the engagement. While I agree with the authors that this may 
lead to a slight degree of overauditing for new clients, for old established clients 
or for clients in specialized industries, there is probably very little overauditing. 
There is certainly not enough overauditing to justify the system described in 
this paper. 
Additional comments concerning the "automation of evaluation of evi-
dence" also trouble me. I believe that the degree to which we remove the 
auditor from the active association with the evaluation of evidence we create 
audit risk. It is great to see that each piece of evidence, gathered mathe-
matically, increases our degree of confidence. However, such techniques may 
create the "halo" effect that has been noted in previous academic studies. 
How questioning will an auditor be if he is examining a piece of audit evidence 
when his nar equals 0.80? Will he still have the same degree of professional 
skepticism required? 
Many firms presently require an auditor to sign off each program step as it 
is completed. Each step is separate and distinct, and represents a concrete 
individual audit unit. Although I recognize that some of the steps give us more 
audit comfort, each step is important and generally must be performed 
diligently. 
In the paper, statements are made concerning analytical review, client 
inquiries and confirmation procedures that are very judgmental and unsup-
ported. SAS No. 56, dated April 1988, will require the application of analytical 
procedures in the planning and overall review stages of all audits [AICPA, 
1988]. The required use of analytical procedures was also recommended in the 
report by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in 
October 1987. Client inquiries and confirmations vary in effectiveness depend-
ing upon the circumstances of the individual client. 
Another practical problem created by this article is illustrated by the 
comment: "The team having reviewed the staff's work makes a judgment that 
the confirmation provides a 90 percent degree of support for validity and an 85 
percent degree of support for the valuation objective." The paper does not 
address how a team would be able to distinguish such a fine degree of 
percentage support for each objective. I believe such a fine distinction would 
not be possible in practice. 
Scenario Two provides even more examples of impractical mathematical 
calculations. In Scenario Two, the engagement team believes that the allow-
ance for bad debts may be understated. They discuss the situation with the 
credit manager, who also agrees with the assessment that the allowance may 
be understated. Based upon this information, the support is calculated at 0.80. 
In my experience, if the client were to agree with the auditor's assessment, 
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the support would be much higher than 0.80. Clients generally do not agree 
unless there is a problem. 
In summary, I believe that the system described in this article will not be 
practicable. The team concept envisioned by this article is not a workable 
concept in practice. The system basically ignores the role of the audit program 
in an audit process and the requirement for preparation of such a program 
during the planning phase of an engagement. Finally, the system provides far 
too many chances for an aggressive litigation counsel to question the firm's 
judgment in the event of an audit failure, and does very little to prevent such a 
failure. 
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